Bekar, Clifford Thomas; PhD
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY (CANADA),1999
ECONOMICS, HISTORY (0509); ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL (0503); HISTORY, EUROPEAN
This thesis explores two productivity puzzles of British economic history, puzzles
that form the basis for
much current policy discussion in industrialized and developing countries. The
first is the choice of
English peasants to farm open rather than consolidated fields; most scholars
agree that the latter were
more productive. The second is the prolonged period of time required for the
technological
breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution to impact productivity growth. The
first chapter tests the
robustness of Deirdre McCloskey's theory that open field agriculture resulted
from behavior towards risk.
Employing a larger data set than McCloskey I develop better estimates of her
key parameters. I use these
new parameter estimates to test the robustness of her theory. I find it is not
as robust as she suggests. I
also find that her hypothesis does not hold when peasants are less than infinitely
risk averse; even
extremely risk averse peasants would consolidate their fields. Chapter Two examines
how medieval
peasants survived chronically bad seed yields. Three explanations dominate:
peasants scattered their
land to reduce the harvest's variance; peasants stored grain; informal networks
were developed to
facilitate income sharing. Many researchers have addressed the viability and
cost of these alternatives
but none has ascertained their relative efficacy. I employ a simulation to rank
scattering, saving, and
pooling in terms of their effects on mortality. I find that pooling was the
most effective insurance
mechanism available to medieval peasants; pooling and storage almost always
dominate scattering; and
even small amounts of savings were more effective than scattering. The third
chapter deals with new
measures of productivity and per-capita output that suggest there was no dramatic
acceleration of growth
in the early Industrial Revolution. Most economic historians confirm that the
period was a highly
innovative one. This is the productivity paradox of the Industrial Revolution—slow
observed
growth in a period of rapid innovation. Many explanations have been advanced
to explain the paradox; I
find them all lacking. My explanation is that the Industrial Revolution is best
understood as a paradigm
shift—a fundamental alteration in the structure of an economy caused
by new technologies. Paul
David has identified the combination of rapid innovation and slow productivity
growth in his study of
electricity's introduction. Many authors have modeled this dynamic, I adopt
one developed by Grossman
and Helpman. The model focuses on the slow diffusion of radical innovations
along with the
development of necessary small-scale innovations needed to make such a technology
productive. I link
the historical literature on the development of key Industrial Revolution technologies
to the parameters
of the theoretical literature. I find that the predictions of the theoretical
literature are borne out in the
historical literature. This eliminates the productivity paradox of the Industrial
Revolution. It also suggests
some broad parallels between the growth experiences of late 18<super>th</super>
century Britain and
late 20<super>th</super> century America.
Social
Systems Simulation Group
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